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Abstract 
This paper applies social network analysis techniques to study computer virus propagation. We 
propose a novel multilevel hierarchical linear model to simultaneously evaluate the impact of both 
individual-level and group-level variables on virus propagation process. In this model, we 
propose centrality and brokerage measures as explanatory variables. We estimate our model 
based on empirical data from the largest social networking website and find that closeness 
centrality (individual level) and brokerage (group level) jointly explain 82.5% of the variance in 
the number of infections. This research contributes to both the literature of computer virus 
propagation and defense and the literature of centrality measure comparison in the filed of social 
network analysis by: (1) performing subgroup analysis and considering multiple levels of network 
characteristics to capture the intrinsic nested feature of the networks and (2) comparing different 
structural measures (centrality and brokerage) in terms of their performance to explain the 
propagation of computer viruses. 
Keywords:  Computer viruses, social network analysis, social networking websites, hierarchical 
linear model 
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Introduction 
Computer virus attacks constantly cause the greatest financial loss and present a top security concern for 
organizations (Gordon et al. 2006). In response, security researchers and practitioners have developed different virus 
defense mechanisms including incoming attack protections and local containments (Brumley et al. 2006). However, 
most of these defense techniques such as intrusion detection and scanning focus on local behavior. Only recently 
have efforts been made to examine global virus propagation processes and the corresponding global defense 
strategies. Considering the entire network instead of individual nodes, researchers investigate the impact of different 
network topologies on virus propagation such as random graph, small-world (Moore and Newman 2000), scale-free 
(Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani 2001; May and Lloyd 2001), and giant strongly connected component (Newman et 
al. 2002) with random graphs usually used as a benchmark case. The topology used in these studies is either 
simulated or real network data. Built upon the underlying network, virus proliferation is modeled as a stochastic 
process. SIS (Susceptible–Infected–Susceptible) and SIR (Susceptible–Infected–Recovered) are the two most 
popular models which originate from mathematical epidemiology. In this paper we adopt a different approach by 
applying techniques from social network analysis to the computer virus propagation problem. 
Social network analysis views social entities as nodes and relationships as edges. Nodes and edges are the two 
fundamental elements in a network. A rich set of concepts and methods have been developed to analyze network 
structures. Wassermann and Faust (1994), a popular text, provides a good review for social network analysis. Social 
network analysis is widely used in sociology, organizational studies and other fields. For example, it is used to 
analyze customer networks, inter-firm alliances, and information flow networks. The focus of social network 
analysis is network structure. Position of a node in a network has significant impact on its influences, opportunities 
and constraints. Individual nodes are nested in subgroups and subgroups are intertwined with each other through 
inter-group connections. Centrality is a widely used structural measure in social network analysis. Among all the 
centrality measures, Freeman’s degree centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality are the most 
popular ones. Researchers have studied and compared these centrality measures from different angles. Costenbader 
and Valente (2003) evaluate the stability of these centralities and find that indegree centrality is relatively stable. 
Borgatti (2005) views dynamic processes built on networks as network flows and compare centrality measures based 
on different types of network flows through conceptual analysis and computer simulation. However, Borgatti (2005) 
finds no centrality measures appropriate for virus propagation processes. 
This paper takes a social network perspective to examine the computer virus propagation problem. An organization 
is viewed as a network where individuals in the organization are nodes in the network and communications among 
individuals form edges in the network. Computer viruses start from certain nodes and propagate through the edges 
and the propagation process can be considered as a special type of network flow. Then the questions become: Does 
the position of the starting node in a virus incident affect the infection result? Can we model the impact of starting 
node using structural measures? This paper proposes a novel solution to address these questions. In particular, we 
conduct a multilevel analysis using a hierarchical linear model to simultaneously examine the impact of both 
individual-level and group-level network characteristics on the computer virus propagation process. Instead of 
asking which single centrality measure is appropriate for the virus propagation process, this paper investigates 
whether structural measures other than centrality help explain virus propagation process. Specifically, in addition to 
centrality, this paper also examines brokerage, another important structural measure. We use Burt’s concept of 
structural holes and related measure of aggregate constraints to evaluate brokerage. 
Our work contributes to both the literature of computer virus propagation and the literature of centrality measure 
comparison in the field of social network analysis. Extant literature on virus propagation turns to simulations to find 
the most risky nodes in a network without questioning what characteristics make these nodes more risky than others. 
Instead, we propose a multilevel starting node effect model of computer virus propagation and therefore provide a 
way to identify risky nodes based on structural characteristics of both the focal individual node and the local group it 
belongs to. By performing a subgroup analysis and considering multiple levels of network characteristics, we are 
able to capture the intrinsic nested features of the networks. 
This paper also contributes to the literature of centrality measure comparison in the field of social network analysis. 
We provide empirical evidence of the relationship between structural measures of the underlying network and 
computer virus propagation processes. Using a hierarchical linear model we find that it is misleading to claim one 
single structural measure is better than another for a complicated dynamic process like computer virus propagation. 
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Instead, we find that several measures interconnect in a more sophisticated way and jointly explain the dynamic 
process. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In next section, we discuss four centrality measures and one 
brokerage measure for both individual level and group level. We then develop our research model step by step 
through four research questions to examine the impact of starting node on computer virus propagation. The section 
of research sample describes the structural characteristics of our sample network. In the following section, we 
conduct computational analysis and present our research results. Finally, we conclude the paper. 
Research Model 
In this section, we investigate the impact of the starting nodes on the spread of computer viruses. We first introduce 
centrality and brokerage measures from the field of social network analysis and use them as individual-level 
variables. We then perform a subgroup analysis and define group-level variables. A hierarchical linear model is 
proposed to explore the impact of structural characteristics of the starting node and its local group on virus 
propagation dynamics. 
Centrality and Brokerage as Individual-level Independent Variables 
The centrality measures reveal how influential and powerful a node is in a social network. In this paper, we use the 
most popular Freeman’s degree, betweenness, and closeness centralities. Formal definitions of centralities can be 
found in Freeman (1978/1979). For directed networks, degree centrality can be further divided into outdegree 
centrality and indegree centrality. Degree centrality measures how many outgoing or incoming edges a node has in a 
network. Betweenness centrality measures how often a node falls on the geodesic paths among pairs of other nodes. 
Closeness centrality gauges how far on average a node is to all other nodes. Intuitively, the more central a node is, 
the more risky it is in the context of computer virus proliferation. 
Burt (1992) proposes the concept of structural hole which refers to the gap between social groups. Brokerage 
represents the ability to fill in the structural hole in a network by connecting nodes which are originally not 
connected. Burt (1992) further defines a quantitative measure called aggregate constraint which can be used as an 
inverse measure for brokerage. A higher aggregate constraint corresponds to a lower brokerage. In the context of 
computer virus propagation, nodes with higher constraint have less chance to spread viruses while nodes with lower 
constraint have higher chance to spread viruses. We hypothesize that centrality and brokerage of the starting node in 
a computer virus incident can be used to predict the infection result. In our starting node effect model, individual-
level independent variables consist of four centrality measures and one brokerage measure. 
Subgroup Analysis and Group-level Independent Variables 
There are cohesive subgroups1 embedded in networks which are important for the study of virus propagation 
because nodes within a subgroup have more connections among each other and therefore are more likely to infect 
each other; nodes between the subgroups have fewer connections and therefore are less likely to infect each other. 
Traditional subgroup analysis techniques include component analysis, clique analysis, core analysis, etc. More 
recently, new algorithms (Newman and Girvan 2004; Clauset et al. 2004) have been proposed to improve the 
performance of subgroup analysis. Newman and Girvan (2004) introduce the concept of modularity which measures 
the degree of variation from random network partition. It is also suggested that any value above 0.3 is a good 
indicator for significant subgroup structure. They also propose a greedy algorithm to maximize the modularity of a 
network. However, their algorithm is very time consuming. In this study, we apply a simple k-core partition2 on the 
network and divide the nodes into subgroups. Our subgroup analysis gives a modularity of 0.246 indicating a fairly 
well network partition. Based on the resulting subgroups, we define group-level independent variables. The most 
 
1 In social network analysis, subgroups are also referred to as communities, clusters, etc. Although there is no consensus on the 
name, the essential concept is a partition of the nodes in one network into multiple subsets and connections within the subsets are 
dense while connections between the subsets are sparse. 
2 “k-core” is a subgroup of a given network where each node has at least k neighbors in the same core. 
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Research Question 4 
Research 
Questions 1 & 2 
Research 
Question 3 
Individual-level Structural Measures
Centrality 
OutDegree 
InDegree 
Betweenness 
Closeness 
Brokerage 
AggConstraint 
Group-level Structural Measures
Centrality 
GroupOutDegree 
GroupInDegree 
GroupBetweenness 
GroupCloseness 
Brokerage 
GroupAggConstraint 
GroupSize
Computer Virus Propagation
Number of Infections 
Cross-level Interaction
straightforward group-level variable is the size of a subgroup. In addition, we also consider the average value of all 
the centrality and brokerage measures in each group. The individual-level and group-level structural variables 
constitute the independent variables in our model. Figure 1 provides the conceptual model with the independent 
variables in the dashed line rectangles and the dependent variable in the double line rectangle. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
A Hierarchical Linear Model of Computer Virus Propagation 
In this subsection, we propose a hierarchical linear model to examine the impact of starting node on computer virus 
propagation. The dependent variable in our model is the number of infected computers, a common measure of the 
severeness of a virus incident. We examine how the position of the starting node in a network affects the number of 
infections. We can utilize the starting node effect model to predict the propagation pattern once we know the starting 
node and the network structure. This model can also be used to identify the set of high risk nodes and has important 
implications for virus prevention, treatment, and containment strategies. For example, IT managers may adopt 
heterogeneous software for high risk nodes as a virus prevention strategy, target high risk nodes as starting points for 
automatic patching as a virus treatment strategy, and/or vaccinate high risk nodes as a containment strategy. 
Network topology has a hierarchical structure with individual nodes nested in subgroups. Hierarchical linear model 
(HLM) is thus used to capture the nested nature of the network topology data and simultaneously assess the 
interactive effect of both individual-level and group-level variables. To examine the starting node effect on virus 
propagation, we propose a two-level hierarchical linear model with individual-level variables at the first level and 
group-level variables at the second level. We provide a complete model specification below to demonstrate the 
hierarchical linear model designed to predict the number of infections. As we will show later, the independent 
variables in the complete model are highly correlated. Hence, we derive reduced models to correct the 
multicollinearity problem and report corresponding research findings. 
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where 0 j = mean number of infections for group j, i.e., group mean; 
 pj = differentiating effect of individual-level measure p for group j, with 1, 2,3, 4, 5p = corresponding to 
OutDegree, InDegree, Betweenness, Closeness, and AggConstraint respectively; 
 ijr = error terms at the individual level; 
 00 = mean number of infections across all groups and all individuals, i.e., grand mean; 
 0q = differentiating effect of group-level measure q on group mean number of infections, with 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6q = corresponding to GroupSize, GroupOutDegree, GroupInDegree, GroupBetweenness, 
GroupCloseness, and GroupAggConstraint respectively; 
 0 ju = error terms at the group level; 
 0p = mean differentiating effect of individual-level measure p across the groups; 
 pq = differentiating effect of group-level measure q on individual-level measure p , i.e., differentiating 
effect of cross-level interactions. 
Essentially the goal of our hierarchical linear model is to explain the number of infections by structural 
characteristics of starting nodes including individual node and local group. We pose the following four research 
questions to develop our starting node effect model step by step. 
• Research Question 1: Are there differences in the impact of starting nodes from different groups? 
• Research Question 2: Do group-level variables (GroupSize, GroupOutDegree, GroupInDegree, 
GroupBetweenness, GroupCloseness, and GroupAggConstraint) explain differences in the group mean number of 
infections? Which group-level variable(s) best explain between-group variance? 
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• Research Question 3: Do individual-level variables (OutDegree, InDegree, Betweenness, Closeness, and 
AggConstraint) explain differences in the number of infections? Which individual-level variable(s) best explain 
within-group variance? 
• Research Question 4: Do the group-level variables (GroupSize, GroupOutDegree, GroupInDegree, 
GroupBetweenness, GroupCloseness, and GroupAggConstraint) influence the magnitude of individual-level 
variables (OutDegree, InDegree, Betweenness, Closeness, and AggConstraint) on explaining the number of 
infections? Are there significant cross-level interactions? 
As indicated in Figure 1, research question 1 tests whether a multilevel analysis is necessary. Based on the result of 
research question 1, research question 2 identifies the best explanatory variable(s) at the second level (group level). 
Research question 3 then compares explanatory variables at the first level (individual level). Finally, research 
question 4 examines the cross-level interactions between individual-level and group-level predictors. 
Research Sample 
In order to examine the computer virus propagation process and further answer the four research questions raised in 
the previous section, we collected empirical data of a large-scale organization’s social network from the largest 
social networking website – MySpace. Social networking websites like MySpace provide many communication 
tools through which computer viruses can spread. In fact, viruses which spread through social networks are more 
prevalent than other traditional viruses. According to TechWeb Technology News, nine of the top ten most 
destructive PC malware of all time are mass-mailing worms3. In addition, users in social networks expose more 
personal information and are thus more vulnerable to computer viruses. For instance, Orkut, Google’s social 
networking website, was recently hit by a virus that stole users’ financial information and passwords (Boudreau 
2006). Analyzing virus propagation in social networks can give us insights into the virus diffusion process. 
The sample organization is the fourth largest research university in the U.S with a total enrollment of more than 
48,000 students. We first gathered all member data on MySpace with affiliation to this university. Mining the 
detailed data of each MySpace member enabled us to construct the corresponding social network. The following 
subsections give detailed descriptions of our research sample. 
Social Networking Websites 
In general, social network is a set of actors and the relations defined on them (Wasserman and Faust 1994). There 
are many different social networks embedded in an organization such as functional divisions, project teams, 
employee email network, and so on. In this paper, for the purpose of studying computer virus propagation, we focus 
on computer-mediated social networks. Common computer-mediated social networks include email network, instant 
messaging network, P2P network, etc. More recently, social networking websites (MySpace, Facebook, and 
LinkedIn, just to name a few) become more and more popular among Internet users. Social networking websites 
integrate email, instant messaging, and other traditional computer-mediated socialization tools and provide a 
sophisticated online social environment where users spend on average 1 hour and 22 minutes a day. Among the 
social networking websites, MySpace, ranked number 15 in the entire U.S. in terms of page hits, has the largest 
membership base of 20.6 million, and accounts for 10% of all advertisements viewed online in October 2005 
(Hempel and Lehman 2005). 
Using Perl and RegEx, we collected data about members of MySpace who are current students of the sample 
university. The number of current student members of this university in MySpace in February 2006 is 14,933, which 
accounts for more than 30% of all enrolled students. One motivation for us to choose this dataset is that college 
students are considered the high risk group in terms of computer virus infection and propagation. The relationship 
from one student member to another on MySpace is uncovered by mining the detailed data published in each 
member’s profile. The resulting network of our research sample is then represented by a directed graph. This 
network is a social network of a large organization with a well defined boundary according to the members’ 
 
3 “The 10 Most Destructive PC Viruses of All Time” by George Jones, July 05, 2006. TechWeb Technology News. 
http://www.techweb.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=160200005  
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affiliation. This paper is among the first to investigate the computer virus propagation using real empirical data from 
a social networking website. 
Network Characteristics 
We calculate the structural properties of the social network of our research sample using two most widely used social 
network analysis software, UCINET and Pajek. The results are summarized in Table 1. The formal definitions of these 
statistics can be found in Wassermann and Faust (1994). These statistics are all network-level measures which give 
us a snap shot of the structure of the social network. The sample social network is very sparse with a density of 
0.0006. Reciprocity rate (0.9833) is very high for this social network which implies most of the relationships 
between student members are mutual. Although the diameter of the network is 13, the mean node-to-node distance 
(4.284) is much shorter. Because of high reciprocity rate of the sample network, indegree and outdegree measures 
share many similarities including a similar centralization measure and similar performance in predicting the spread 
of computer viruses (which we will discuss later). Closeness varies much more than the other three centrality 
measures. In summary, our sample social network shows significant clustering and salient subgroup structure which 
are distinguishing features of social networks (Newman and Park 2003). 
Table 1. Network Characteristics 
Category Statistics Name Statistics Value 
Network Type Directed/Undirected Directed 
Number of Nodes 14933 
Number of Edges 140228 Network Size 
Mean Degree 9.390 
Mean Density 0.0006 
Transitivity 0.151 
Clustering Coefficient 0.252 
Reciprocity Rate 0.983 
Mean Node-to-node Distance 4.284 
Diameter 13 
Cohesion 
Reachability 0.617 
InDegree Centralization 0.0200 
OutDegree Centralization 0.0202 
Betweenness Centralization 0.0377 Centralization 
Closeness Centralization 0.263 
Computational Analysis and Results 
Virus Propagation Simulation 
Computer virus propagation has been widely researched using epidemiology models (Kephart and White 1991, 
1993). Among these epidemiology models, SIR (Susceptible–Infected–Recovered) model is most commonly used 
(May and Lloyd 2001; Chen and Carley 2004). Researchers conduct computer simulations to analyze the virus 
propagation process. Following the SIR model, we developed computer algorithms to simulate the virus propagation 
in the social network constructed from empirical data to address the research questions posed in the previous 
section. There are three states for each node in the network. The node can be susceptible, infected, or recovered. A 
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susceptible node is not infected but susceptible to virus and can be infected by its neighbors. An infected node i can 
infect its neighbor j according to j ’s infection probability j . After trying to infect its neighbors, the infected 
node i may be recovered according to its recovery probability i . If the infected node i is recovered, then it 
becomes immune to future infections. In practice, we consider an infected node as recovered when the virus is 
eliminated from the computer by the user through patching. Every infected node can try to infect its neighbors at all 
times before it is recovered. 
We applied the discrete-time simulation method. Beginning at time 0, a single randomly chosen node becomes 
infected and this node starts the virus propagation process. We randomly selected 3000 starting nodes. The 
propagation process stops either when the virus stops spreading, i.e., when the number of currently infectious nodes 
reduces to 0, or when the process runs long enough and reaches the maximum iteration number of time epoch 
100T = . We assume a power law distribution of the simulation parameters i (the probability that node i gets 
infected in each infection attempt) and i (the probability that node i gets recovered at time 1t + given that node i
is infected at time t ). The power-law distribution captures the asymmetric nature of user behaviors. Most of the 
users have high infection rate and recovery rate while only few of them have low infection rate and recovery rate. 
We set the parameter of the exponential in the power-law distribution to 2.690 and 2.286 for infection rate and 
recovery rate respectively. The parameters are chosen such that the mean value of the infection rate and recovery 
rate are consistent with the empirical findings in the literature4. For each starting node, we ran the simulation 50 
times. So the total number of simulations run is 150000 ( 3000 50= × ). Among these simulations, the virus dies out 
9774 (6.52%) times and epidemics occur 140226 (93.48%) times. Then we calculated the mean value for the 
number of infections and used it as the dependent variable. Appendix A gives the pseudo-code for our virus 
propagation simulation. 
The entire network has 14933 nodes in 44 subgroups. We randomly chose 3000 nodes as starting nodes. After 
excluding the starting nodes whose local subgroup has less than 10 members, our sample consists of 2974 starting 
nodes and 31 subgroups. The data set is unbalanced with the size of the subgroups ranging from 11 to 1360. 
Calculation of Independent Variables 
We used Pajek to calculate values for individual-level independent variables – outdegree, indegree, betweenness, 
closeness and brokerage. Subgroup analysis was also carried out in Pajek. Table 2 and Table 3 provide descriptive 
statistics and correlations for the individual-level and group-level independent variables, respectively. Most of the 
correlations are significant and have the expected signs. These high correlations cause multicollinearity problems. In 
next subsection, we report the reduced HLM model that removes some independent variables to correct the 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 2. Individual-level Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD OutDegree InDegree Betweenness Closeness AggConstraint 
OutDegree 11.77 12.06 —     
InDegree 11.70 11.99 .999** —    
Betweenness 0.00015 0.00030 .801** .801** —   
Closeness 0.19 0.03 .667** .667** .508** —  
AggConstraint 0.28 0.28 -.576** -.576** -.371** -.736** — 
Notes: N = 2974 for individual level. 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
4 Chen and Carley (2004) found the ratio of infection rate to recovery rate is between 0.01 and 0.2 with a mean of 
0.05. 
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Table 3. Group-level Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variable Mean SD GroupSize Group OutDegree 
Group 
InDegree 
Group 
Betweenness 
Group 
Closeness 
Group 
AggConstraint 
GroupSize 383.81 455.22 —      
Group 
OutDegree 21.82 20.50 -.433* —     
Group 
InDegree 21.56 20.38 -.427* 1.000** —    
Group 
Betweenness 0.00026 0.00025 -.355 .860** .862** —   
Group 
Closeness 0.20 0.02 -.482** .861** .864** .845** —  
Group 
AggConstraint 0.18 0.20 .445* -.600** -.603** -.594** -.889** — 
Notes: N = 31 for group level. 
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Research Results 
We present our research findings in the order of research questions as follows. 
• Research Question 1: Are there differences in the impact of starting nodes from different groups? 
Table 4 summarizes the results of a basic unrestricted model for research question 1 where the individual-level 
model is 0ij j ijY r= + and the group-level model is 0 00 0j ju = + . The results indicate that there are significant 
differences in the impact of starting nodes from different groups with 2 10408.837	 = and p-value close to 0. In 
other words, a two-level model is necessary in order to assess individual-level and group-level variables 
simultaneously. 
Table 4. Research Question 1 Results 
Coefficient 10454.737 Fixed 
Effect Group mean 00 SE 168.172 
Variance 850456.929 
df 30 
2	 10408.837 
Group-level error 0 ju
p-value 0.000 
Random 
Effect 
Individual-level error ijr Variance 470929.033 
• Research Question 2: Do group-level variables (GroupSize, GroupOutDegree, GroupInDegree, 
GroupBetweenness, GroupCloseness, and GroupAggConstraint) explain differences in the group mean number of 
infections? Which group-level variable(s) best explain between-group variance? 
To evaluate and compare the impact of group-level variables on group infection numbers, we specify the group-level 
model as 
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while keeping the individual-level model the same as 0ij j ijY r= + . Since there are significantly high correlations 
among these six group-level explanatory variables, we further evaluate a reduced form of this model with only one 
group-level independent variable to eliminate the multicollinearity problems. We find GroupSize is not significant in 
explaining group mean virus propagation measures. Snijders and Bosker (1999) discuss a multilevel version of R-
squared. Within-group R-squared type statistic is defined as the proportional reduction of error for predicting an 
individual outcome. Between-group R-squared type statistic is defined as the proportional reduction of error for 
predicting a group mean. Table 5 compares the model fit using between-group (group-level) variance explained for 
the remaining five group-level independent variables. We find that the abilities to explain differences in the group 
means of these five variables vary dramatically. Among them, GroupAggConstraint has the strongest explanation 
power. 
Table 5. Research Question 2 Results 
Comparison of Group-level Explanatory Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Group-level Independent 
Variable Group-level Restricted Error 
Between-group Variance 
Explained 
GroupOutDegree 759993.152 0.106 
GroupInDegree 757969.985 0.109 
GroupBetweenness 765245.217 0.100 
GroupCloseness 461364.546 0.458 
Number of  
Infections 
GroupAggConstraint 108556.076 0.872 
• Research Question 3: Do individual-level variables (OutDegree, InDegree, Betweenness, Closeness, and 
AggConstraint) explain differences in the number of infections? Which individual-level variable(s) best explain 
within-group variance? 
We next investigate how the five individual-level variables affect infection numbers. We find similar 
multicollinearity problems for the individual-level variables as for the group-level variables. Therefore we reduce 
the model to only one individual-level variable. Table 6 contains the comparison results for all five independent 
variables and four dependent variables. We find that individual-level closeness measure far outperforms all the other 
structural measures. 
Table 6. Research Question 3 Results 
Comparison of Individual-level Explanatory Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Individual-level 
Independent Variable 
Individual-level Restricted 
Error 
Within-group Variance 
Explained 
OutDegree 471101.435 0.000 
InDegree 471100.914 0.000 
Betweenness 471087.654 0.000 
Closeness 257903.545 0.452 
Number of  
Infections 
AggConstraint 469533.985 0.003 
• Research Question 4: Do the group-level variables (GroupSize, GroupOutDegree, GroupInDegree, 
GroupBetweenness, GroupCloseness, and GroupAggConstraint) influence the magnitude of individual-level 
variables (OutDegree, InDegree, Betweenness, Closeness, and AggConstraint) on explaining the number of 
infections? Are there significant cross-level interactions? 
Finally we examine the possible cross-level interactions in our starting node effect model. We report the estimation 
results of the HLM model in Table 7. We find significant interactive effect between individual-level closeness 
centrality (Closeness) and group-level brokerage (GroupAggConstraint) in explaining the number of infections. Our 
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final estimation results show that the hierarchical linear models we proposed explain 82.5% of the total variance for 
the number of infections. 
Table 7. Research Question 4 Results 
Coefficient 12705.333 
Group mean 00 SE 344.553 
Coefficient -12757.799 
GroupAggConstraint 01
SE 488.344 
Coefficient -8184.990 
Closeness 10 SE 1602.908 
Coefficient 52795.386 
Fixed 
Effect 
Closeness * GroupAggConstraint 11 SE 1644.882 
Variance 71019.594 
df 29 Group-level error 0 ju
2	 650.658 
Random 
Effect 
Individual-level error ijr Variance 160271.871 
Variance Explained: 82.5% 
Concluding Remarks 
As Internet access becomes ubiquitous, so is the spread of computer viruses, causing serious worldwide damage to 
computer users and organizations in the order of tens of billions of dollars per year. Research to understand how 
virus spreads and how to effectively defend it is more important than ever. This paper takes the social network 
perspective to study the computer virus problem and proposes a novel multilevel starting node model for virus 
propagation. We use hierarchical linear models to simultaneously evaluate the impact of both individual-level and 
group-level variables on virus propagation processes. We find that individual-level closeness centrality (Closeness) 
and group-level brokerage (GroupAggConstraint) are the best predictors for the individual-level and group-level 
variances respectively. Although our research focuses on one particular network flow process – virus propagation, 
the methodology proposed in this work can be generalized to other processes such as network-based diffusion and so 
on. The significant impact of both individual-level and group-level structural measures found in this paper can also 
be applied into firms’ decisions on security investment (Cavusoglu et al. 2004) and socio-organizational policies 
(Baskerville and Siponen 2002). 
This paper uses a unique real network data set obtained from the largest social networking website representing an 
integrated social network of a large organization. We estimate the starting node model based on real empirical 
network data. The resulting model can be used for computer virus proliferation prediction as well as virus 
prevention, treatment, and containment strategies. 
One key contribution of this paper is the introduction of a hierarchical linear model to explain dynamic network 
processes using static structural characteristics. We believe there are many interesting extensions to this work. For 
example, in addition to predicting the number of infected computers, it is useful to know how much time it takes for 
a computer virus to break out and the time it takes to reach the plateau of infection. 
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Appendix A. Pseudo-code for Virus Propagation Simulation (SIR) 
t = 0
InfNum = 1 
CurrentInfNum = 1 
StartingNode.blnInfected = True 
StartingNode.blnCurrentRound = True 
WHILE (t < MaxIter AND CurrentInfNum > 0) 
 FOR each individual node 
 IF (blnInfected = True AND blnRecovered = False AND blnCurrentRound = True) THEN 
 FOR each neighbor 
 IF (the neighbor NOT infected) THEN 
 Try to infect the neighbor 
 IF (the neighbor gets infected) THEN 
 Set its blnInfected = True 
InfNum = InfNum + 1 
CurrentInfNum = CurrentInfNum + 1 
 END IF 
END IF 
NEXT neighbor 
Try to recover the individual node 
 IF (the individual node gets recovered) THEN 
 Set blnRecovered = True 
CurrentInfNum = CurrentInfNum - 1 
 END IF 
END IF 
NEXT individual node 
 Set blnCurrentRound to True for all the infected nodes 
 t = t + 1 
END WHILE 
